Philosophy Emerging from Culture

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CHAPTER III

RATIONALITY IN ISLAMIC PERIPATETIC AND ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHIES

SAYYED HASSAN HOUSSEAINI

INTRODUCTION

Studying the history of philosophy is a kind of philosophizing, provided that we engage in it in a contemplative way. Thus, this paper sees this study as an invitation to thinking, rather than just a historical report.

Many of us live in a world influenced by modernity, and Enlightenment philosophy is the main source of modernity. Of course, Islamic civilization and cultures also make up a great part of this world. An important school in Islamic philosophy world is that of what has been called “peripatetic philosophy.” This philosophy is associated with Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr (c.870-950), Ibn Sina, Abu ‘Ali al-Husayn (known in Latin as Avicenna) (980-1037), and Ibn Rushd, Abu’l Walid Muhammad (known in Latin as Averroes) (1126-98).

We can find a common point between the Islamic peripatetic and Enlightenment philosophies based on their use of rationality. The overall objective of this paper is to present some of the different aspects of rationality in these two philosophies. We can find a kind of congruence between these philosophies. They commonly defend universality, unity, and permanence of reason. They do not accept a priori truths, and emphasize the limits of rationality. On their respective views, rationality corrects its mistakes gradually. This suggests that we can have a dialogue between Western Enlightenment and Islamic cultures through rationality.

The overall objective of this paper, then, is to reconstruct Islamic peripatetic and Enlightenment philosophies on the basis of their notion of the rationality. It tries to show this by referring to the major Muslim peripatetic philosophers and to Enlightenment philosophy as described by Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945).

BACKGROUND

Before proceeding to the main objective of this paper, by way of background let me mention two important points:

1. We can find three philosophical schools in Islam:
   a) The Peripatetic school. This is the golden age of Islamic philosophy, in the three centuries from Al-Kindi, Abu Yusuf Ya’qub ibn Ishaq (d. c.866-73) to Ibn Rushd.
b) The Wisdom of Illumination or Al-Hikmat Al-Ishraq school. The illuminative school of Islamic philosophy is associated with al-Suhrawardi, Shihab al-Din Yahya (1154-91).\(^1\)

c) The school of Transcendent philosophy or Al-Hikmat al-mutaa’liyah. This is a special type of scholastic philosophy based on the existential intuition of Reality, a result of philosophizing about the mystical ideas and visions obtained through rational contemplation.\(^2\) This school is also known by the name of Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Din Muhammad al-Shirazi) (1571/2-1640).\(^3\)

The school that is closest to Western Enlightenment philosophy is the peripatetic school. Philosophers, such as Etienne Gilson and Henri Corbin, made this comparison in some of their works, basing this comparison on the method used.\(^4\) This is one reason why I focus here on the peripatetic school exclusively. Moreover, the mark of the peripatetic school, distinguishing it from those two other Islamic schools, is the emphasis on pure rationality.

2. There are many different interpretations of the nature of the Enlightenment, but here we adopt the reading of Ernst Cassirer because he is a defender of the Enlightenment and interprets it as a great philosophy. In other words, instead of simply emphasizing some aspects of Enlightenment philosophy, he explains the main force and direction of it. He is a neo-Kantian, and follows Kant’s motto: Sapere aude (Dare to know). Cassirer writes:

>The age which venerated reason and science as man’s highest faculty cannot and must not be lost ever for us. We must find a way not only to see that age in its own character, but to release again those original forces which brought forth and molded this character.\(^5\)

These forces are reason and its facilities and its source.

It is will also be useful to explain the meaning of rationality in these two philosophies.

RATIONALITY IN ISLAMIC PERIPATETIC PHILOSOPHY

In Islamic peripatetic philosophy, rationality and philosophy are closely related to each other. Al-Kindi, the first philosopher in the Islamic world, presents a single definition for philosophy and rationality: “the knowledge of the truth of things.”\(^6\) We will say more about the “truth of things” later. Furthermore, peripatetic philosophy distinguishes itself from other sorts of knowledge by emphasizing pure rationality.

Peripatetic rationality is both self-sufficient and immanent. It is self-sufficient because it does not accept anything without understanding its origins and growth. The treatise of Ibn Tufayl, Abu Bakr Muhammad (before 1110-85), *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan* [The Living Son of the Vigilant], is a
good example of this. It is immanent, because it does not transcend the limitations of human reason. Moreover, Al-Kindi did not use the word “active intelligence” and did not accept a separate being for intelligence, as Professor Al-Yasin shows; the separate intelligence is the divine part of human soul only. Ibn Sina seems to have accepted the existence of a separate intellect, but presented a description of obtaining rational knowledge that did not depend on that.

To begin, let us consider reason within the Islamic peripatetic tradition.

**Reason**

In general, we can find two meanings for reason in Islamic peripatetic philosophy: as a separate being within creation, and as the highest potential of the human soul. (It is known as Reason for one of these reasons: it is capable of reasoning; it understands and reasons actually; it has intelligible ideas and knowledge). It is clear that we are focused on the second meaning of reason here.

Human reason does not have any a priori ideas or knowledge. It is a pure faculty increasing by sense datum. Our ideas first originate from our senses. We arrive at judgment by the combination and comparison of our sense data. Al-Farabi, a father of Islamic philosophy, says that:

> The soul understands the sensational forms by senses and rational forms by their sensational forms...the human can find knowledge by senses only, and the perception of universals, can obtain by perception of sensational perception of individuals.

Ibn Sina continues the above remark by Al-Farabi by saying:

> Only God and the separate intelligences can reach a rational perception without sensational perception. The human does not have this possibility.

The logic of Ibn Sina is obviously empirical, as Gilson showed. We can also show this by analyzing the nine parts of his logic: the five universals, definition and description, proposition, and the content of the syllogism and its form.

We cannot find the five universals, however, without empirical perception of their referents. Ibn Sina says that we can get to definitions by composition only. This composition takes place by the observation of some referents, and the correspondence of the ideas of our mind to what is objective. We can also understand the truth or falsity of propositions by referring to the objective world. The form of the syllogism does not give us any information about the realms of reality. It gives us information about the mind only. What is important in the discussion of the syllogism is the
demonstrative syllogism. This syllogism originates from sense data. The Mulla Rajab Ali Tabrizi (one of the commentators on Islamic peripatetic philosophy), in describing this idea of Ibn Sina, writes that not only actual propositions, but the factual propositions will be based on perception by the senses alone.  

In the logic of Ibn Sina we can see an empirical source for the philosophy of Ibn Tufayl. Ibn Tufayl showed the gradual growth of rational knowledge in the Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. At first, the child, Hay, did not have special ideas any more than animals. However, he eventually arrives at the existence of the soul by analyzing the body of a gazelle that he knows as his mother. He believes in celestial substances by seeing fire. Ibn Tufayl then shows how Hay arrives at perception of unity and diversity by analyzing sense perceptions and so on. We see this approach throughout this treatise. When Ibn Tufayl strays from empirical rationality, he falls into an ambiguous situation. For example, he cannot prefer eternity to the non-eternity of the world, because he does not have an empirical conception of it.

Reason and the Abstraction of Universals

If we accept that all knowledge begins with sense perception, and we do not have any knowledge without general ideas and judgments, then how do particular sense perceptions lead to general and universal knowledge? The “Theory of Abstraction” answers this question. We get to universals by gathering several ideas from a single object, comparing them to another, abstracting characters, and removing some personifications. However, the criterion of truth is not the corresponding of ideas with universals, but in their correspondence with our experience of external and internal facts. We can see this attitude expressly in Ibn Rushd. He seeks to return philosophy to its original source — i.e., he explains nature and physics, and seeks to base metaphysics on physics. On his view, the philosopher is the one who contemplates all beings, gets to common sense from sensation, and does not find any knowledge without basing it on sense perceptions. Ibn Rushd criticizes the views of Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina of an objective distinction between essence and existence. This distinction, Ibn Rushd says, originates from a theological perspective. This perspective has a conception of truth as that which corresponds to the noumenal, instead of that which corresponds to the object.

The Limitations of Reason

The first philosopher in Islamic world, Al Kindi, noted the “limitations of human ability” in the definition of philosophy: specifically, the limitations of human knowledge and human character of this knowledge. He continued that reason cannot have a positive knowledge of God. It can have only a negative knowledge of Him. We can see this view, from another
perspective, in Ibn Khaldun, the last philosopher of Islamic peripatetic thought. He focuses on the limitation of our cognitive reason.

Furthermore, Al Farabi, in his important treatise Al-Talika’t (The Annotations), emphasizes that the ideal of philosophy is not arriving at the truth or essence of things, but simply obtaining some implications and accidental features of things, because our abilities are limited.22 Ibn Sina repeats Al Farabi’s view in his Al-Talih’q’t. Also, Al Farabi and Ibn Sina both express the view that real wisdom only belongs to God. We can merely approach the truth; we cannot reach it.23

Rational Progress

In the history of Islamic philosophy, there is a famous view that states that, in his last period of his life, Ibn Sina moved towards the Al-Hekmat Al-Mashreqiya (Eastern wisdom) from peripatetic philosophy. On my view, I see this as meaning that he does not see his philosophical school as the end of knowledge and that he seeks other approaches to knowledge. In the first part of his work (Hajj Ibn Yaqqan), Ibn Tufayl emphasizes that his ideas correspond to Ibn Sina’s eastern wisdom. What follows for us from these two points is that Ibn Sina believes in the insufficiency of his formal philosophy and that knowledge requires further progress.

This opinion clearly appears in Ibn Rushd.24 In his important book Al Fasl Al Maqa’l, he writes that we can gradually get to a better state of knowledge in the practical sciences, as well as in the theoretical disciplines. No one can engage in a technique if he is alone, and so the same holds about the technique of techniques, namely philosophy. Muslim scholars must learn and criticize their predecessor’s ontology and epistemology, by accepting their valid inferences and overlooking the erroneous, because the cognition is a human thing and has its limitations as well as a process for correction and evaluation.25 Ibn Rushd adds that this accords with Islamic jurisprudence – namely that God connives at the accepting of a rational conclusion; even it is wrong.26

RATIONALITY IN ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY

Rationality in Enlightenment philosophy is opposed to fideism, voluntarism, and even the rationalism of the Cartesians. It emphasizes the self-sufficiency of reason for knowledge, progress, and happiness. For a deeper explanation, let us begin by discussing reason itself.

Reason

The age of Enlightenment calls itself the age of reason. But what is reason? This age says more about what it aspires to, than what it is. Ernst Cassirer writes:
the age senses that a new force is at work within it; but it is even more fascinated by the activity of this force than by the creation brought force by that activity. It rejoices not only in results, but it inquires into, and attempts to explain, the form of the process leading to these results.27

In this approach to philosophy, we see a force vigorously dealing with facts, rather than a static entity having some necessary or a priori knowledge and ideas. Here, the criterion of truth is not the correspondence of objective and sense data with rational principles and rules; it is in the correspondence of rational principles and rules with objective and sense data. Truth, such as philosophy, thus becomes more extended and flexible.28 The task of reason is approaching the truth, not arriving at it, as Lessing declared in his famous motto. If we cannot arrive at the essence of a thing, we are at least on the way to it. From this viewpoint, the Enlightenment exhibits a lust for knowledge (libido scienti). Philosophy became a main and necessary quality of the human soul and is restored to its original rights.29 This philosophy attempts to shows how to approach, not to obtain, truths. We see this approach even in the Encyclopedia itself; in contrast to the previous century, “Reason is now looked upon rather as inquisition than as a heritage.”30

However, we know reason by its function, not by its results. Its most refined function consists in its power to bind and to dissolve. It dissolves everything merely factual, all simple data of experience and everything believed on the evidence of revelation, tradition and authority; and it does not rest content until it has analyzed all those things into their simplest component parts and into their minutest elements of belief and opinion. Following this work of dissolution, the work of construction begins.31 Reason, then, builds a new structure, a true whole. It creates this whole and fits the parts together according to its own rule. Thus, we have a human and temporal knowledge, but no divine or eternal knowledge.32 In addition, philosophical reason is immanent and self-sufficient. Against the relapse into transcendence, this philosophy proclaims the pure principle of immanence for knowledge, as for cosmology. Both must be understood in terms of their own essence.33

The Possibilities of Reason

The first and main source of our knowledge is sense data. On the Enlightenment view, the human being is a perceiving or sensing animal as well as a thinking animal. Enlightenment philosophy begins with sense but does not remain with it. It seeks to evaluate all things by relating them to objective facts. The logic of the facts becomes the replacement for the logic of the scholastic and of the purely mathematical concept. Principles are merely points for further research, than the terminal points that declare the
final essence of things. Rational rules are the aim of philosophy, not the starting point of philosophical investigations.34

There are two persons who are particularly important for later Enlightenment philosophy; John Locke and Isaac Newton. The first comes with a new reading of the famous scholastic principle: “Nothing is in the intellect which was not first in sense.”35 The latter argues against Aristotelian physics. The common point of these two great scholars is emphasizing knowledge based on experience and sense. After a discussion of the Newtonian pattern of rationality, Cassirer states:

Thus it is evident that, if we compare the thought of the eighteenth century with that of the seventeenth, there is no real chasm anywhere separating the two periods. The new ideal of knowledge develops steadily and consistently from the presuppositions which the logic and theory of knowledge of the seventeenth century had established. The difference in the mode of thinking does not mean a radical transformation; it amounts merely to a shifting of emphasis. This emphasis is constantly moving from the general to the particular, from principles to phenomena. But the basic assumption remains: that is, the assumption that between the two realms of thought there is no opposition, but rather complete correlation. The rationalistic postulate of unity dominates the minds of this age. The concept of unity and that of science are mutually dependent.36

Cassirer sees Enlightenment philosophy as dynamic, not as static.37 He writes:

Yet if one wishes to grasp the entire intellectual structure of the eighteenth century and see it in its genesis, one must clearly separate the two streams of thought which converge at this point. The classical Cartesian form of analysis and that new form of philosophical synthesis which originates in Leibniz38 are now integrated. From the logic of “clear and distinct ideas” the way leads to the logic of “origin” and to logic of individuality; it leads from mere geometry to a dynamic philosophy of nature, from mechanism to organism, from the principle of identity to that of infinity, from continuity to harmony.39

The Limitations of Reason

On the Enlightenment model, the powers of reason are more modest. As Locke says, our minds are not made so that we can reach all truth. He is not an essentialist, but he allows that we can arrive at the inner order of a thing.

We must, of course abandon all hope of ever wresting from things their ultimate mystery, of ever penetrating to the absolute being of
matter or of the human soul. If, however, we refer to empirical law and order, the inner core of nature proves by no means inaccessible. In this realm we can establish ourselves and proceed in every direction. The power of reason does not consist in enabling us to transcend the empirical world but rather in teaching us to feel at home in it.\footnote{40}

However, this philosophy emphasizes that our reason can find a kind of unity and permanence beyond diversity and change:

the rationalistic postulate of unity dominates the minds of this age. The concept of unity and that of science are mutually dependent. All sciences put together, says d’Alembert repeating the opening sentences of Descartes’ Rules for the Conduct of the Understanding, are nothing but human intelligence, which always remains one and the same, and is always identical with itself; however different the objects may be to which it is applied.\footnote{41}

This originates from our reason, the main and unique feature of man.\footnote{42} From this standpoint, philosophy can arrive at natural laws and rights, natural religion, and so on… and their unity. Rational knowledge is human knowledge and has its limitations.

Rational Progress

Although, progress is one of the main principles of Enlightenment philosophy, Cassirer does not deal with it separately. Progress means the gradual development and founding of human knowledge in all its aspects.\footnote{43} If reason is nothing except a force that develops by confrontation with facts, it can become more intelligent by confronting more facts, addressing them, and exploring their possibilities. Cassirer adds an important note:

But we mistake the essence of this conception (Progress), if we understand it merely in a quantitative sense as an extension of knowledge indefinitely. A qualitative determination always accompanies quantitative expansion, and an increasingly pronounced return to the characteristic centre of knowledge corresponds to the extension of inquiry beyond the periphery of knowledge.\footnote{44}

We can, then, find a basic understanding of the idea of progress if we attend to three points: the unity of philosophy and reason; the unity of philosophy and philosophizing; and the limitations of human knowledge.
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

The father of Islamic philosophy understands philosophy as a move from primary nature to second nature. Here, a comparative approach using a dialogical language may be able to accomplish more than ordinary or logical languages. As mentioned above, western Enlightenment and Islamic peripatetic philosophies emphasize the process of thinking, more than the ideas and opinions arrived. They claim that they are returning to the approach of earlier philosophies and to the main meaning of philosophy too. But here we will concentrate on their notion of rationality.

Plato taught us that exotic similarities can lead us to error. So allow me to note some differences before proceeding.

Islamic peripatetic philosophy frequently looks at reason as a kind of being, as what makes the human soul of the highest rank. In other words, this is an ontological view of reason. But in Enlightenment philosophy, we have an epistemological view of reason Here, reason is a function and potential, rather than a kind of being or actual thing.

Again, peripatetic philosophy speculatively tells us about the impossibility of obtaining perfect definitions of things, but practically it remains in the hard framework of categories. Furthermore, this philosophy argues about the ontological aspects of real entities, rather than of abstract entities such as culture, civilization, and history. But Enlightenment philosophy moves from categories to abstract entities, and analytical and conceptual logic changes to synthetic and genetic logic.

Finally, although peripatetic philosophy speculatively emphasizes sense data and concrete object, practically it remains in the realm of the theoretical and conceptual. Enlightenment philosophy, however, forms its ideas and judgments in the concrete and empirical world. Then it can reflect on the state, politics, culture, history, art, and technology.

Nevertheless, there is much common ground between these two philosophical traditions that link them to one another and which can help us to address a number of difficulties. Let me identify a few common similarities between the two philosophies:

1. Self-sufficiency of Reason: The two philosophies believe in the autonomy of reason in approaching truth and refuse to accept any authority without justification.
2. Immanent reason. Rationality, in these two traditions, does not seek to transcend its limitations. They engage in investigation within the limitations of reason.
3. Correspondence of object and subject. Both philosophies believe that reason can know the external world and add that our minds also are aware of the limits of this knowledge. They believe in common sense and start with it.
4. The unity and permanence of reason. Both philosophies believe that all human minds ultimately follow the rules, and that they can come to agreement if people follow philosophical method rigorously. Thus, there is
a permanent element beyond all ethical, religious and theoretical differences. This shows the permanency of reason.

5. Approaching, not attaining truth, even though they offer theories on cosmology, anthropology and the like. Both philosophies hold that we do not get to essence of things, though we must strive constantly to approach it. Nevertheless, both have been accused of dogmatism and totalitarianism.

6. Humanization of knowledge. Both philosophies emphasize that philosophy is a human knowledge. They deny that philosophers can have access to any divine knowledge. Philosophical knowledge has limitations.

RELEVANCE TO THE PRESENT ERA

Why do we pay attention to peripatetic philosophy in the Islamic world and to Enlightenment philosophy in the era of globalization? Because both philosophies emphasize rationality as the sole ground for dialogue and sympathy. Let me explain this by making two points:

Globalization is a reflection of the universal rationality of Enlightenment philosophy. We showed that such a rationality is a common ideal of the two philosophies discussed above. It is arrived at by emphasizing the unity and permanence of reason in all cultures and nations. But we must not confuse ideal and reality, process and project. The Enlightenment philosophers paid special attention to the gradualness of this process and its relation to rational progress. Similarly, Al-Farabi emphasized the gradual realization of philosophy in society. He thought very much about the difference between philosophers and prophets. But the Islamic rational tradition was political from the start, as Professor Mehdī shows.45

We see this position more clearly in Enlightenment philosophy. Those philosophers were not utopian doctrinaires, as Cassirer clearly notes:

Their craving for reality and their flexible sense of the real are indisputable. They all want to set to work immediately, for they are aware that the road from theory to practice is long and toilsome. Even such a fanatical theorizer as d’Holbach (in his System of Nature for instance) does not attempt as a political thinker to transplant his speculations directly into realities. In his Social System he rejects all revolutionary solutions of problems, declaring that such cures are always worse than the disease. The voice of reason is neither mutinous nor bloodthirsty; the reforms it proposes are gradual but thereby all the more effective. On the other hand, all these thinkers are convinced that reason must bear the torch on the way to political and social betterment. The ability to overcome the evils of the state and of society can only arise from a real “enlightenment”, from a clear insight into the grounds and origins of abuses.46
Islamic culture is a rationalistic culture. The Qur’an, the holy book of Muslims, repeatedly emphasizes rationality, thinking, knowing and contemplation. The words knowledge, reason and reasoning, and thinking appear there more than a hundred times. The first chapters of great Islamic books (such as *Al islah kaifi* and *Al sahih-e bukhari*) have titles like ‘the book of reason’ or ‘book of knowledge.’ The first theological school in the Islamic world was a rational school: Al- Mu’azzalah. In this intellectual sphere, great Muslim philosophers have appeared. The peripatetic philosophy was the first philosophical school in the Islamic world. Ibn Rushd is the culmination point of this manner of thinking. He wrote an excellent treatise on the relationship between Islamic jurisprudence and philosophy. As an important Muslim jurist and a legal treatise, not as a philosopher and a philosophical treatise, he establishes the obligation for Muslims to learning philosophy, based on a verse of the Qur’an -- the first verse that descended on Islamic Prophet, Muhammad. But after this golden age of Islamic civilization, Islamic thought fell into mysticism and the revelatory approach called Al-Ash’ariyya. Both of these deny pure rationalization, and give currency to divine inspiration and mystic intuition. We can find these two schools together in the ideas of Al-Ghazzali. Ibn Arabi (the greatest Sufi in Islamic mysticism) taking part in the funeral process of Ibn Rushd is a sign of the burying of pure rationalism in Islamic culture. The event changed the fate of Islamic world.

So, if we come back to our time, it seems that we do not have any choice except accepting rationality. Rationality in Islamic peripatetic and Enlightenment philosophies has a common meaning. It gives us a ground of dialogue and fellow-feeling. It reforms itself, and it is aware of its limitations. About Enlightenment philosophy, Cassirer says:

> The consideration of the philosophic past must always be accompanied by philosophical re-orientation and self-criticism. More than ever before, it seems to me, the time is again ripe for applying such self-criticism to the present age, for holding up to it that bright clear mirror fashioned by the Enlightenment.

I would emphasize, too, that we need Islamic peripatetic philosophy to critique the situation of the Islamic world. The age of globalization and the situation of Muslims both require confronting rationality and engaging in self-criticism. Remember what Cassirer says:

> But we should be guilty of hasty judgment and dangerous self-deception if we were simply to ascribe these distortions to opaque spots in the mirror, rather than to look elsewhere for their source.

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NOTES

1 See: Suhrawardi, Shihab al-Din. *Hikmat al-ishraq* (The Theosophy of Illumination, Qum, 1313 (A.H. Lunar) /1895.


7 Al-Yasin, *al-Filsafan al-raedan*, 42-4)

8 Dr. Ghavam Safari (Professor of philosophy at Tehran University) has done independent and valuable research on the emergence of this notion of “active intelligence” in Islamic Peripatetic Philosophy, and its correspondence with the foundations of Peripatetic philosophy: see Mahdi Ghavam Safari, *How is Metaphysics Possible?* (Tehran. 2008), pp. 149-163.


12 See Gilson, op. cit. for the part of Arabic and Jewish philosophy; Muhammad Sacid Shaikh, *Comparative studies on Islamic philosophy*, translated into Persian by Musifita Muhaqeq Damad (Tehran: Kharazmi, 1369 (A.H.solar)), p. 133.

13 Ibn Sina (Avicenna), *AL-NEYJAT (The Salvation)* (Tehran: Tehran University, 1364 (A.H.solar)), pp. 147-150.

14 Gholam Hossein Ibrahimi Dinani, *General Philosophical Principles in Islamic philosophy* (Tehran: Cultural Studies and Research Institute,
1987), 2/437.
16 Ibn Tufayl, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, p. 84.
17 Ibn Tufayl, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, pp. 92 and 97.
20 Jean Wahl, Bahs dar mabad al-tabiat (Traite de Metaphysique; Paris, 1953), translated into Persian by Yahya Mahdavi (Tehran: Khorazmi, 1380 (A.H.solar)), p. 150.
24 Al-Kindi emphasizes that we cannot get to the Truth alone; this is a task that has to be done by all scholars and thinkers from around the world and over a lengthy temporal process; see: Al-Kindi, rasa’el al-Kindi al-Falsafiyah (Al-Kindi’s philosophical treatises), edited by Abu Ryda (Gahera, 1369(A.H.solar)), pp. 103-4.
27 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 5.
31 Cassirer presents a detailed account of this approach in physics, psychology and theory of the state (politics) and society (society) of this age. See Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, pp. 12-19.
33 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 45.
34 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 22.
35 Nihil est in intellectu quod non antea fuerit in sensu.
36 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 22.
38 “While opposing the principles of Leibniz’s metaphysics,
d'Alembert shows the deepest admiration for Leibniz's philosophical and mathematical genius. And Diderot's article on Leibniz in the Encyclopedia bestows enthusiastic praise on the philosopher. Diderot agrees with Fontenelle that Germany has gained as much honor through this one mind as Greece did through Plato, Aristotle, and Archimedes together” Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 35.

41 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 22-23.
42 From this viewpoint, Enlightenment philosophers arrive at the unity of Philosophy and Reason, and the unity of Philosophy itself. As Cassirer says: “Thus it is evident that, if we compare the thought of the eighteenth century with that of the seventeenth, there is no real chasm anywhere separating the two periods. The new ideal of knowledge develops steadily and consistently from the presuppositions which the logic and theory of knowledge of seventeenth century – especially in the works of Descartes and Leibniz – had established... the basic assumption remains; that is the assumption that between the two realms of thought there is no opposition but rather complete correlation... The self-confidence of reason is nowhere shaken...” (Cassier, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 22). There are remarks about Aristotle’s influence on Christian Wolff (the main representative of the second stage of the German Enlightenment) in Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy; Wolff to Kant, Vol. 6 (London, 1977), p. 6. Also, we note the paper by Jonathan Israel, “Spinoza vs. Locke in the Later French Enlightenment Controversies (1760-1789),” in XXII World Congress of Philosophy; Rethinking Philosophy Today (Abstracts) (Seoul: Korean Organizing Committee, 2008).
43 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 5.
44 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 5.
47 Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid (1058-1111) is one of the most outstanding and influential figures in the thought and culture of the Islamic world. His character and works have been praised by many thinkers. Nevertheless, there are many criticisms of his ideas and opinions. A recent book offers a novel assessment of Ghazali’s epistemic and religious views. The method which is used in this article is different from the method employed by Averroes and other philosophers. Using this method, the author identifies Ghazali’s positive and negative influences on humanity’s thought, status, knowledge and justice. See Yahya Yasebi, Naqde Ghazali (The Critique of Ghazali) (Tehran: Kanon-e andishe-e Javan, 1384).
48 After this period, there are three great scholars in the Islamic world who appear to emphasize the role of rationality in Islamic theology; Abu Jafar Tahavi (d. 321.A.H.lunar), Abu Mansur Maturidi (d. 333.A.H.lunar)
and, in Islamic mysticism, Mulla Sadra (1571/2-1640). But I think that they were not successful from a theoretical standpoint.


CHAPTER IV

THE ANTHROPY AND CULTURE ACCORDING TO KAROL WOJTYLA

ANDREWN. WOZNICKI

To explain the concept of theanthropy, I propose to consider both nature and culture in terms of virtuality. However, they should not be understood as simple logical possibilities and/or simple potentialities — as is often argued by those who are following modern scientific thinking and mathematical deliberation. I wish to argue, the concept of virtuality should be explained as being in the state of *active potentiality*, which is very close to its actualization, as having both efficacious and causative ontic character, that is a real force with an ability of something to unfold from its state of a *real potentiality* to the state of its factual actualization — just like the effect in this view which is found in a particular cause.¹

In this chapter, I will concentrate on the virtual power which can be found in cultural phenomena. However, in view of the fact that all virtual existences of truth are, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, found in God’s Mind absolutely, no created human mind can attain any absolute certainty, though it can have knowledge of an analogical nature.

¹

In his speech at the headquarters of UNESCO, John Paul II underscored the educating role of culture, by saying that any genuine culture makes *man — human*. He stated that “the first and most fundamental purpose of culture in general, and each and every culture specifically, is the formation of a man.”²

In *Pamiec i tozsamosc* [Memory and Identity], regarding the phenomenon of culture, John Paul II formulated a fundamental definition of human culture:

_Fill the earth and subdue it* (Gen 1, 28). These words are the foremost and the most complete of human culture. Subduing the Earth means discovering and confirming the truth about man’s _humanness_. … By the same token God gave man specific mission; man has to realize the truth about himself and about the world. Man has to govern himself accordingly to the truth about himself, in order to be able to design the visible world, so man would be able to use the world properly, without abusing it.³

In his other works, John Paul II often discusses morality as a foundation of for culture, thus evaluating the whole realm of human